The 2007 Iran Nuclear Estimate Revisited: Anatomy of a Controversy explores both the contents and reaction to the U.S. intelligence community's (IC) National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that Iran had suspended its clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons. The volume offers insights into the art of intelligence analysis and the issues encountered when estimates run counter to policy or partisan preferences. In November 2007, the U.S. National Intelligence Council issued an NIE entitled Iran's Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities that contained a surprising finding. Analysts concluded that Iran had probably suspended its clandestine effort to develop a nuclear weapon. This assessment created a political firestorm, despite the fact that analysts went to great lengths to assess the accuracy of their sources and to offer nuanced judgments about the complex issues surrounding Iran's civilian and military nuclear programs. In this edited volume, former intelligence professionals and leading intelligence scholars describe and assess the factors that shaped this NIE and the course of events that sparked an international controversy. These chapters make a valuable contribution to the understanding of the state of the art when it comes to intelligence analysis and the challenges that emerge when intelligence estimates address significant foreign and defence policy issues and on-going political debates. One of the chapters in this volume was originally published in the book titled, Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, edited by Robert Dover, Michael Goodman, Claudia Hillebrand. Other chapters were originally published in the journals Intelligence and National Security and Comparative Strategy.

The shock of Donald Trump’s election caused many observers to ask whether the liberal international order—the system of institutions and norms established after World War II—was coming to an end. The victory of Joe Biden, a committed institutionalist, suggested that the liberal order would endure. Even so, important questions remained: Was Trump an aberration? Is Biden struggling in vain against irreparable changes in international politics? What does the future hold for the international order? The essays in Chaos Reconsidered answer those questions. Leading scholars assess the domestic and global effects of the Trump and Biden presidencies. The historians put the Trump years and Biden’s victory in historical context. Regional specialists evaluate U.S. diplomacy in Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Others foreground topics such as global right-wing populism, the COVID-19 pandemic, racial inequality, and environmental degradation. International relations theorists reconsider the nature of international politics, pointing to deficiencies in traditional IR methods for explaining world events and Trump’s presidency in particular. Together, these experts provide a comprehensive analysis of the state of U.S. alliances and partnerships, the durability of the liberal international order, the standing and reputation of the United States as a global leader, the implications of China’s assertiveness and Russia’s aggression, and the prospects for the Biden administration and its successors.

Since the development of the modern state system in Europe four centuries ago, there have been ten general wars involving a majority of the major powers and a high level of casualties. Another major war is difficult to conceive of, since it would presumably be the last such conflict, and yet it is not an impossibility. In this volume a distinguished group of political scientists and historians examine the origins of major wars and discuss the problems in preventing a nuclear war.

To say that the world changed drastically on 9/11 has become a truism and even a cliche. But the incontestable fact is that a new era for both the world and U.S. foreign policy began on that infamous day and the ramifications for international politics have been monumental.
In "American Foreign Policy in a New Era," one of our leading thinkers in international relations, Robert Jervis, provides us with several snapshots of world politics over the past few years. Jervis brings his acute analysis of international politics to bear on several recent developments that have transformed international politics and American foreign policy including the War on Terrorism; the Bush Doctrine and its policies of preventive war and unilateral action; and the promotion of democracy in the Middle East (including the Iraq War) and around the world. Taken together, Jervis argues, these policies constitute a blueprint for American hegemony, if not American empire. All of these events and policieshave taken place against a backdrop equally important, but less frequently discussed: the fact that most developed nations, states that have been bitter rivals, now constitute a "security community" within which war is unthinkable.
"American Foreign Policy in a New Era" is a must read for anyone interested in understanding the policies and events that have shaped and are shaping U.S. foreign policy in a rapidly changing and still very dangerous world.

To say that the world changed drastically on 9/11 has become a truism and even a cliche. But the incontestable fact is that a new era for both the world and U.S. foreign policy began on that infamous day and the ramifications for international politics have been monumental.
In "American Foreign Policy in a New Era," one of our leading thinkers in international relations, Robert Jervis, provides us with several snapshots of world politics over the past few years. Jervis brings his acute analysis of international politics to bear on several recent developments that have transformed international politics and American foreign policy including the War on Terrorism; the Bush Doctrine and its policies of preventive war and unilateral action; and the promotion of democracy in the Middle East (including the Iraq War) and around the world. Taken together, Jervis argues, these policies constitute a blueprint for American hegemony, if not American empire. All of these events and policieshave taken place against a backdrop equally important, but less frequently discussed: the fact that most developed nations, states that have been bitter rivals, now constitute a "security community" within which war is unthinkable.
"American Foreign Policy in a New Era" is a must read for anyone interested in understanding the policies and events that have shaped and are shaping U.S. foreign policy in a rapidly changing and still very dangerous world.

The shock of Donald Trump’s election caused many observers to ask whether the liberal international order—the system of institutions and norms established after World War II—was coming to an end. The victory of Joe Biden, a committed institutionalist, suggested that the liberal order would endure. Even so, important questions remained: Was Trump an aberration? Is Biden struggling in vain against irreparable changes in international politics? What does the future hold for the international order? The essays in Chaos Reconsidered answer those questions. Leading scholars assess the domestic and global effects of the Trump and Biden presidencies. The historians put the Trump years and Biden’s victory in historical context. Regional specialists evaluate U.S. diplomacy in Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Others foreground topics such as global right-wing populism, the COVID-19 pandemic, racial inequality, and environmental degradation. International relations theorists reconsider the nature of international politics, pointing to deficiencies in traditional IR methods for explaining world events and Trump’s presidency in particular. Together, these experts provide a comprehensive analysis of the state of U.S. alliances and partnerships, the durability of the liberal international order, the standing and reputation of the United States as a global leader, the implications of China’s assertiveness and Russia’s aggression, and the prospects for the Biden administration and its successors.

Since its original publication in 1976, Perception and Misperception in International Politics has become a landmark book in its field, hailed by the New York Times as "the seminal statement of principles underlying political psychology." This new edition includes an extensive preface by the author reflecting on the book's lasting impact and legacy, particularly in the application of cognitive psychology to political decision making, and brings that analysis up to date by discussing the relevant psychological research over the past forty years. Jervis describes the process of perception (for example, how decision makers learn from history) and then explores common forms of misperception (such as overestimating one's influence). He then tests his ideas through a number of important events in international relations from nineteenth- and twentieth-century European history. Perception and Misperception in International Politics is essential for understanding international relations today.

Robert Jervis has been a pioneering leader in the study of the psychology of international politics for more than four decades. How Statesmen Think presents his most important ideas on the subject from across his career. This collection of revised and updated essays applies, elaborates, and modifies his pathbreaking work. The result is an indispensable book for students and scholars of international relations. How Statesmen Think demonstrates that expectations and political and psychological needs are the major drivers of perceptions in international politics, as well as in other arenas. Drawing on the increasing attention psychology is paying to emotions, the book discusses how emotional needs help structure beliefs. It also shows how decision-makers use multiple shortcuts to seek and process information when making foreign policy and national security judgments. For example, the desire to conserve cognitive resources can cause decision-makers to look at misleading indicators of military strength, and psychological pressures can lead them to run particularly high risks. The book also looks at how deterrent threats and counterpart promises often fail because they are misperceived. How Statesmen Think examines how these processes play out in many situations that arise in foreign and security policy, including the threat of inadvertent war, the development of domino beliefs, the formation and role of national identities, and conflicts between intelligence organizations and policymakers.

The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002.

The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation.

In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved."

Donald Trump's election has called into question many fundamental assumptions about politics and society. Should the forty-fifth president of the United States make us reconsider the nature and future of the global order? Collecting a wide range of perspectives from leading political scientists, historians, and international-relations scholars, Chaos in the Liberal Order explores the global trends that led to Trump's stunning victory and the impact his presidency will have on the international political landscape. Contributors situate Trump among past foreign policy upheavals and enduring models for global governance, seeking to understand how and why he departs from precedents and norms. The book considers key issues, such as what Trump means for America's role in the world; the relationship between domestic and international politics; and Trump's place in the rise of the far right worldwide. It poses challenging questions, including: Does Trump's election signal the downfall of the liberal order or unveil its resilience? What is the importance of individual leaders for the international system, and to what extent is Trump an outlier? Is there a Trump doctrine, or is America's president fundamentally impulsive and scattershot? The book considers the effects of Trump's presidency on trends in human rights, international alliances, and regional conflicts. With provocative contributions from prominent figures such as Stephen M. Walt, Andrew J. Bacevich, and Samuel Moyn, this timely collection brings much-needed expert perspectives on our tumultuous era.

Why do men act violently toward women? What are the consequences of "normal violence," not only for women and children but also for the men who instigate it, and for the societies that sanction it? The Evils of Polygyny examines one powerful structural factor that instigates, enforces, and replicates patterns of male dominance: the practice of polygyny. From more than a decade's worth of study, Rose McDermott has produced a book that uncovers the violent impact of polygyny on women, children, and the nation-state and adds fundamentally to the burgeoning focus on gender concerns in political psychology and international relations. Integrating these fields, as well as domestic policy and human rights, the author urges us to address the question of violence toward women and children. If we do not, a system that tells young women they must marry whom their elders dictate and devote their entire lives to serving others will continue to plague the contemporary world, and restrict development. The timely nature of McDermott's book reflects the mission of the Easton Lectures at the Interdisciplinary Center for the Scientific Study of Ethics and Morality at the University of California, Irvine, which charges its lecturers to produce work that is creative, controversial, and cutting-edge, and offers substantial real-world impact. The Evils of Polygyny, edited by Kristen Renwick Monroe, includes commentary from Valerie Hudson, Robert Jervis, and B. J. Wray. The book does just that, providing a coherent analysis of sexual violence and a provocative and chilling analysis of one of the major problems of the contemporary world.

Robert Jervis has been a pioneering leader in the study of the psychology of international politics for more than four decades. How Statesmen Think presents his most important ideas on the subject from across his career. This collection of revised and updated essays applies, elaborates, and modifies his pathbreaking work. The result is an indispensable book for students and scholars of international relations. How Statesmen Think demonstrates that expectations and political and psychological needs are the major drivers of perceptions in international politics, as well as in other arenas. Drawing on the increasing attention psychology is paying to emotions, the book discusses how emotional needs help structure beliefs. It also shows how decision-makers use multiple shortcuts to seek and process information when making foreign policy and national security judgments. For example, the desire to conserve cognitive resources can cause decision-makers to look at misleading indicators of military strength, and psychological pressures can lead them to run particularly high risks. The book also looks at how deterrent threats and counterpart promises often fail because they are misperceived. How Statesmen Think examines how these processes play out in many situations that arise in foreign and security policy, including the threat of inadvertent war, the development of domino beliefs, the formation and role of national identities, and conflicts between intelligence organizations and policymakers.

Robert Jervis argues here that the possibility of nuclear war has created a revolution in military strategy and international relations. He examines how the potential for nuclear Armageddon has changed the meaning of war, the psychology of statesmanship, and the formulation of military policy by the superpowers.

Since its original publication in 1976, Perception and Misperception in International Politics has become a landmark book in its field, hailed by the New York Times as "the seminal statement of principles underlying political psychology." This new edition includes an extensive preface by the author reflecting on the book's lasting impact and legacy, particularly in the application of cognitive psychology to political decision making, and brings that analysis up to date by discussing the relevant psychological research over the past forty years. Jervis describes the process of perception (for example, how decision makers learn from history) and then explores common forms of misperception (such as overestimating one's influence). He then tests his ideas through a number of important events in international relations from nineteenth- and twentieth-century European history. Perception and Misperception in International Politics is essential for understanding international relations today.

International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues has been helping students effectively understand the dynamics of international relations for almost fifty years. Readings by leading scholars on essential topics illustrate fundamental debates and differing points of view for a comprehensive and engaging overview of the discipline, while introducing readers to the major forces shaping the world today. The fourteenth edition continues the book's cornerstone approach of combining foundational theoretical works with recent perspectives on current problems, including a wealth of new material spread across each of the book's four parts. The foundational material is organized to highlight the concept of anarchy in international relations and how matters of security, power, military force, international political economy, and strategic interactions influence patterns of cooperation and conflict. In additional to a focus on basic security and strategic problems, the politics of international commerce, and challenges facing the global economy, this edition also covers critical contemporary issues, including human rights, civil wars, intervention and peacekeeping, migration, cyber conflict, great power competition, climate change, energy transition, nuclear weapons, pandemic diplomacy, and changes in the political shape of the system writ large. Features: -60 expertly edited readings from scholarly sources, with 30 new to this edition -A four-part organization to cover anarchy, the use of force, international political economy, and contemporary issues, with an in-depth editor introduction to each Part -An entirely new chapter on the return of great power politics -- ever-more important after Russia's invasion of Ukraine -Learning objectives and discussion questions to focus student learning

Donald Trump's election has called into question many fundamental assumptions about politics and society. Should the forty-fifth president of the United States make us reconsider the nature and future of the global order? Collecting a wide range of perspectives from leading political scientists, historians, and international-relations scholars, Chaos in the Liberal Order explores the global trends that led to Trump's stunning victory and the impact his presidency will have on the international political landscape. Contributors situate Trump among past foreign policy upheavals and enduring models for global governance, seeking to understand how and why he departs from precedents and norms. The book considers key issues, such as what Trump means for America's role in the world; the relationship between domestic and international politics; and Trump's place in the rise of the far right worldwide. It poses challenging questions, including: Does Trump's election signal the downfall of the liberal order or unveil its resilience? What is the importance of individual leaders for the international system, and to what extent is Trump an outlier? Is there a Trump doctrine, or is America's president fundamentally impulsive and scattershot? The book considers the effects of Trump's presidency on trends in human rights, international alliances, and regional conflicts. With provocative contributions from prominent figures such as Stephen M. Walt, Andrew J. Bacevich, and Samuel Moyn, this timely collection brings much-needed expert perspectives on our tumultuous era.

Based on more than three decades of observation, Robert Jervis concludes in this provocative book that the very foundations of many social science theories--especially those in political science--are faulty. Taking insights from complexity theory as his point of departure, the author observes that we live in a world where things are interconnected, where unintended consequences of our actions are unavoidable and unpredictable, and where the total effect of behavior is not equal to the sum of individual actions. Jervis draws on a wide range of human endeavors to illustrate the nature of these system effects. He shows how increasing airport security might actually cost lives, not save them, and how removing dead trees (ostensibly to give living trees more room) may damage the health of an entire forest. Similarly, he highlights the interconnectedness of the political world as he describes how the Cold War played out and as he narrates the series of events--with their unintended consequences--that escalated into World War I.

The ramifications of developing a rigorous understanding of politics are immense, as Jervis demonstrates in his critique of current systemic theories of international politics--especially the influential work done by Kenneth Waltz. Jervis goes on to examine various types of negative and positive feedback, bargaining in different types of relationships, and the polarizing effects of alignments to begin building a foundation for a more realistic, more nuanced, theory of international politics. "System Effects" concludes by examining what it means to act in a system. It shows how political actors might modify their behavior in anticipation of system effects, and it explores how systemic theories of political behavior might account for the role of anticipation and strategy in political action. This work introduces powerful new concepts that will reward not only international relations theorists, but also all social scientists with interests in comparative politics and political theory.

Why do men act violently toward women? What are the consequences of "normal violence," not only for women and children but also for the men who instigate it, and for the societies that sanction it? The Evils of Polygyny examines one powerful structural factor that instigates, enforces, and replicates patterns of male dominance: the practice of polygyny. From more than a decade's worth of study, Rose McDermott has produced a book that uncovers the violent impact of polygyny on women, children, and the nation-state and adds fundamentally to the burgeoning focus on gender concerns in political psychology and international relations. Integrating these fields, as well as domestic policy and human rights, the author urges us to address the question of violence toward women and children. If we do not, a system that tells young women they must marry whom their elders dictate and devote their entire lives to serving others will continue to plague the contemporary world, and restrict development. The timely nature of McDermott's book reflects the mission of the Easton Lectures at the Interdisciplinary Center for the Scientific Study of Ethics and Morality at the University of California, Irvine, which charges its lecturers to produce work that is creative, controversial, and cutting-edge, and offers substantial real-world impact. The Evils of Polygyny, edited by Kristen Renwick Monroe, includes commentary from Valerie Hudson, Robert Jervis, and B. J. Wray. The book does just that, providing a coherent analysis of sexual violence and a provocative and chilling analysis of one of the major problems of the contemporary world.

"A provocative collection."--David C. Unger, "New York Times"

Now available in paperback, "Psychology and Deterrence" reveals deterrence strategy's hidden and generally simplistic assumptions about the nature of power and aggression, threat and response, and calculation and behavior in the international arena.

The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002.

The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation.

In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved."

These days, it's rare to pick up a newspaper and not see a story related to intelligence. From the investigations of the 9/11 commission, to accusations of illegal wiretapping, to debates on whether it's acceptable to torture prisoners for information, intelligence-both accurate and not-is driving domestic and foreign policy. And yet, in part because of its inherently secretive nature, intelligence has received very little scholarly study. Into this void comes Reforming Intelligence, a timely collection of case studies written by intelligence experts, and sponsored by the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at the Naval Postgraduate School, that collectively outline the best practices for intelligence services in the United States and other democratic states. Reforming Intelligence suggests that intelligence is best conceptualized as a subfield of civil-military relations, and is best compared through institutions. The authors examine intelligence practices in the United States, United Kingdom, and France, as well as such developing democracies as Brazil, Taiwan, Argentina, and Russia. While there is much more data related to established democracies, there are lessons to be learned from states that have created (or re-created) intelligence institutions in the contemporary political climate. In the end, reading about the successes of Brazil and Taiwan, the failures of Argentina and Russia, and the ongoing reforms in the United States yields a handful of hard truths. In the murky world of intelligence, that's an unqualified achievement.

Fearing the loss of Korea and Vietnam would touch off a chain reaction of other countries turning communist, the United States fought two major wars in the hinterlands of Asia. What accounts for such exaggerated alarm, and what were its consequences? Is a fear of the domino effect permanently rooted in the American strategic psyche, or has the United States now adopted a less alarmist approach? The essays in this book address these questions by examining domino thinking in United States and Soviet Cold War strategy, and in earlier historic settings. Combining theory and history in analyzing issues relevant to current public policy, Dominoes and Bandwagons examines the extent to which domino fears were a rational response, a psychological reaction, or a tactic in domestic politics.